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ABSTRACT
Does the center country of the International Monetary System enjoy an "exorbitant privilege" that
significantly weakens its external constraint as has been asserted in some European quarters? Using
a newly constructed dataset, we perform a detailed analysis of the historical evolution of US external
assets and liabilities at market value since 1952. We find strong evidence of a sizeable excess return
of gross assets over gross liabilities. Interestingly, this excess return increased after the collapse of
the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate system. It is mainly due to a "return discount": within each
class of assets, the total return (yields and capital gains) that the US has to pay to foreigners is
smaller  than  the  total  return  the  US  gets  on  its  foreign  assets.  We  also  find  evidence  of  a
"composition effect": the US tends to borrow short and lend long. As financial globalization
accelerated its pace, the US transformed itself from a World Banker into a World Venture Capitalist,
investing greater amounts in high yield assets such as equity and FDI. We use these findings to cast
some light on the sustainability of the current global imbalances.
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
UC Berkeley












hrey@princeton.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper takes a fresh look at the historical evolution of the United States external position over
the postwar period by carefully constructing the US gross asset and liability positions since 1952
from underlying data and applying appropriate valuations to each components.
The last two decades have been characterized by a sharp increase in international capital ﬂows
and in particular by a rising globalization of equity markets.1 The broadening of the set of assets
internationally traded, the switch to a ﬂoating exchange rate regime in 1973 and the larger size
of gross asset and liability positions have made it increasingly necessary to incorporate valuation
adjustments when computing net foreign asset positions.
The net foreign asset position of a country is nothing but a leveraged portfolio where the country
is short in domestic assets and long in foreign assets. Hence, changes in asset prices and exchange
rate movements will either tighten or relax the US external constraint. For instance, everything
else equal, a depreciation of the dollar generates a capital gain on US foreign asset holdings, which
increases the return on its net foreign portfolio. As of December 2004, the BEA reports a US
net foreign asset position of -$2.5 trillion (or 22% of GDP), with assets representing $10 trillion
(85% of GDP) and liabilities $12.5 trillion (107% of GDP). Almost all US foreign liabilities are in
dollars whereas approximately 70% of U.S. foreign assets are in foreign currencies. Hence a 10%
depreciation of the dollar represents, ceteris paribus, a transfer of around 5.9% of US GDP from
the rest of the world to the US. For comparison, the trade deﬁc i to ng o o d sa n ds e r v i c e sw a s5 . 3 %
of GDP in 2004. These capital gains can therefore be very large.2
This paper revisits a number of historical stylized facts about the US external adjustment in
light of the new data that we have put together.3 Of particular interest to us is the idea that the
US’s unique position in the international monetary order allows it to enjoy an ‘exorbitant privilege’,
in the famous words attributed to de Gaulle in 1965.4 The speciﬁcd e ﬁnition of this exorbitant
1These phenomena have been documented in particular in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) and Lane and Milesi-
Ferretti (2004).
2See also Tille (2003) and Tille (2004).
3We present in the Appendix a line by line description of the database we use in this paper and in Gourinchas
and Rey (2005).
4In fact, the quote is nowhere to be found in de Gaulle’s speeches. It is actually Val´ ery Giscard d’Estaing, Finance
Minister at the time, who spoke of an ‘exorbitant privilege’ in February 1965. He was then cited by Raymond Aron
2privilege has varied over time and with diﬀerent commentators. For some, it refers to the fact that
the US’s income balance has remained positive all these years, despite mounting net liabilities. For
others -and this was the interpretation favored by the French in the 1960s- the exorbitant privilege
referred to the ability of the US to run large direct investment surpluses, ultimately ﬁnanced by
the issuance of dollars held sometimes involuntarily by foreign central banks. This particular
interpretation views the US as playing a pivotal role, at the center of the world ﬁnancial system.
In the words of Kindleberger (1965) and Despres, Kindleberger and Salant (1966), the US was
the ‘Banker of the World’, ‘lending mostly at long and intermediate terms, and borrowing short’
thereby supplying loans and investment funds to foreign enterprises and liquidity to foreign asset
holders. Since then, the US has become an increasingly leveraged ﬁnancial intermediary as world
capital markets have become more and more integrated. Hence, a more accurate description of
the US in the last decade may be one of the ‘Venture Capitalist of the World’, issuing short term
and ﬁxed income liabilities and investing primarily in equity and direct investment abroad. While
the latter interpretation of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ is, of course, consistent with the former, it is
conceptually distinct. The United States’ excess return of its external assets over liabilities may
come from a ‘return eﬀect’ (higher returns within each asset class) or from a ‘composition eﬀect’
(the structure of the balance sheet is asymmetric with more low yielding assets on the liability
side). One contribution of this paper is to present a break-up of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ into
these ‘return’ and ‘composition’ eﬀects over the whole post war period.
We begin by presenting our estimates of the net foreign asset position of the US between 1952
and 2004 in section 2. In particular, we compare our results to the oﬃcial numbers. Section 3
provides a ﬁrst historical measure of the exorbitant privilege by estimating yields and total returns
on the net foreign assets of the US between 1952 and now. We show that our data support the
notion that the US enjoyed a substantial premium on its gross assets relative to its liabilities and
that this premium has been increasing since the collapse of the Bretton Woods ﬁxed exchange rate
system.
Section 4 studies the evolution of the composition of gross assets and liabilities and relates it
to the role of the US as the world venture capitalist. We ﬁnd that a non negligible fraction of the
in Le Figaro, February 16, 1965 p.1475 of Les articles du Figaro, vol. II (Editions de Fallois). We thank Andrew
Moravcsik and Georges-Henri Soutou for this information.
3exorbitant privilege comes from the risk premium that the US enjoys, even though the major part
of the exorbitant privilege comes from return diﬀerentials between US and foreign assets within
each class of assets. Finally, in section 5, we present simple estimates of the amount of depreciation
of the US dollar needed to wipe out given amounts of US external debt via both the valuation and
trade channels.
2 Measurement of the US external asset position
2.1 The US net foreign asset position reconstructed: 1952-2004
We ﬁrst set the stage with a comparison of various estimates of the US net foreign asset position.
The methodological details on the construction of our own estimates are provided in appendix A.
Brieﬂy, the main drawback of the oﬃcial series is that they generally measure the US external
investment position not at current prices but at historical cost. It is well known, for example,
that the current account is measured at historical cost. This implies that the oﬃcial statistics
are inappropriate to study valuation eﬀects. Hence we construct market value estimates of each
asset and liability category from 1952 by combining data from the BEA’s international investment
positions data (after 1980) and data on international transactions from both the BEA and the
Flow of Funds. We compute dollar capital gains or losses for each asset category (equity, bonds,
FDI, bank loans and trade credit) and apply those valuation adjustments to our international
investment position series. We use available Treasury benchmark surveys on external asset and
liabilities to form estimates of the currency and country weights in the US investment portfolio.
Our constructed series give therefore a quarterly account of US external wealth dynamics at market
prices since 1952:1, disaggregated by asset class.
Figure 1 reports three diﬀerent measures of the US net foreign asset position. We denote by
NFAt our constructed net foreign asset position at the end of period t. F i g u r e1a l s or e p o r t st h e
‘naive’ estimate obtained from cumulating current accounts,5 as well as the BEA’s estimates of the
US International Investment Position (IIP) at market value since 1982.
The three series exhibit a striking common trend: the US went from a sizeable creditor position
5Starting from our estimate of NFA in 1952:1. The current account data are from the NIPA (Table 4.1), since
the BoP data only extend back to 1960. There are small diﬀerences between the BoP and the NIPA deﬁnitions of











Figure 1: U.S. Net Foreign Assets, relative to GDP. 1952:1 to 2004:1. Source: BEA and Author’s
Calculations.
in 1952 (15% of GDP) to a large debtor position (-26% of GDP) by the end of the period. According
to our data, the US became a net debtor around 1988, which is roughly similar to the oﬃcial data
with valuation eﬀects (1989). Our NFAseries is also reassuringly close to the BEA’s IIP estimates
available only after 1982, in spite of a diﬀerent approach to valuing direct investment positions.
While the general tendency of the three measures is the same, Figure 1 reveals that valuation
components have an important inﬂuence on the short to medium run dynamics of the US external
position. We deﬁne the valuation component as the diﬀerence between our measure (NFA)a n d
the cumulated current account series (
P
CA). It reﬂects exactly the cumulated value of the capital
gains and exchange rate adjustments omitted from the current account measure. Figure 2 reports
this net valuation component as a share of GDP and highlights a number of interesting facts.
First, during the Bretton Woods period and until 1977, the cumulated current account measure
tended to overestimate the NFA position of the US, by up to 4% of GDP. Since then, valuation
eﬀects worked in favor of the US, and reached a peak of 9.4% percent of GDP in 1994:3. The ﬁgure
reveals a striking correlation: the valuation component was on average negative while the US was
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Figure 2: Net Valuation Component (relative to GDP)
o v e rt h ee n t i r ep e r i o d , and with the exception of a few years, the valuation component worked to
stabilize the net foreign asset position of the US and oﬀset current account movements.
Second, the evolution of the valuation component is consistent with the broad evolutions of the
US dollar. The period of the dollar depreciation after 1985 as well as the more recent depreciation
can be clearly identiﬁed on the ﬁgure, associated with an increase in the valuation component.
Conversely, between 1995 and 2003 the valuation component largely disappeared while the dollar
appreciated.
Third, there are a few important exceptions to that pattern. Most dramatically, we observe a
dramatic turnaround in the valuation component in 1977-1980. Between 1976:4 and 1980:2, the
valuation components shifts from -3.6 percent to 5.9 percent of GDP, a total shift representing
about 10% of GDP. During that period, the returns on US gross foreign assets far exceeded the
returns on US gross liabilities. This was in large part due to low returns on US equities. The
US stock market dramatically underperformed the foreign stock markets over that period which
substantially increased the value of US net foreign assets.6
6During this period, the annual dollar capital gain on the US stock market averaged only 2.2% while the same
return was 31.7% on the UK stock market and 18.3% on the Japanese stock market. These two countries accounted
for 38% of US equity assets (see table 6 in appendix B.3).
62.2 Gross external positions and valuations.
One additional beneﬁt of reconstructing the net foreign asset position from the underlying disaggre-
gated data is that we can document the time evolution of the gross assets and liabilities separately.
Figure 3 and 4 report the ‘naive’ construction of gross asset and liability positions, starting in 1960
and cumulating the corresponding Balance of Payment ﬂows, together with our estimates. The
diﬀerence between the two series provides a direct estimate of the valuation component on the
underlying gross positions (ﬁgure 5 reports the two valuation components side by side)
We observe ﬁrst that the share of US gross assets in GDP remained stable or even slightly
declining between 1952 and 1975 (ﬁgure 3). Starting in 1975, it has grown rapidly, reaching 80
percent of GDP in 2000. The share of US gross liabilities in GDP, on the other hand, has increased
throughout the postwar period, with a sharp acceleration post-1980 (ﬁgure 4).
The valuation component on the gross positions is an order of magnitude larger than on the
net positions. It accounts for 45 percent of gross assets and 30 percent of gross liabilities in 2000,
and around 35 percent of GDP. The evolution of that component reﬂects the evolution of asset
returns. Both valuation components grew rapidly over time until 2000 (ﬁgure 5). Then they
declined precipitously as asset prices around the world collapsed.
3 The Exorbitant Privilege, Part I: Yields and Total Returns
Now that the stage is set, we begin our analysis of the external balance of the US. We start with
the famous observation that the large increase in US net liabilities to the rest of the world has
not been accompanied by a commensurate increase in net income payments. It is well-known that
the income account has remained positive for the US despite gross liabilities exceeding assets by
approximately 34% in 2004. In other words, the income generated by the (smaller) US-owned
assets abroad is larger than the income paid on the (larger) foreign-owned assets in the US. This
observation is sometimes taken as evidence that the US enjoys an ‘exorbitant privilege’ in the sense
that it can borrow at a discount on world ﬁnancial markets. Figure 6 presents the annual yield on
the NFAas a percent of GDP, since 1960. Despite a substantial drop in the mid 1980s, it remained
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Figure 6: Yield and Total Return on NFA (in percent, annual rate, relative to GDP). Source: US
International Transactions (BEA) and author’s calculations.
9One should recognize, however, that the yield represents only one component of the total return
on US gross external assets and liabilities. The other component is the dollar capital gain or loss
due to asset price and currency ﬂuctuations. Figure 6 reports our estimate of the total annual
return on the net foreign asset portfolio, as a percent of GDP.
The ﬁrst striking observation is the volatility of total returns relative to yields, especially after
1975. Total returns ﬂuctuate between -3.4 and 6.4 percent of GDP while the income balance
represents between 0.09 and 1.2 percent of GDP (we can see on this ﬁgure the large total return
between 1976 and 1980 that underlies the turnaround in the valuation component, as well as the
eﬀect of the depreciation of the dollar after 1985).
Second, total returns can be substantially negative. The annual return (relative to GDP) was
indeed negative in all but two years from 1995 to 2001, a period during which the dollar appreciated
substantially.
Third, despite this substantial volatility, the average total return on assets and liabilities is
consistent with the evidence on yields. Over the sample period, we ﬁnd that the annualized average
real rate of return on gross liabilities (3.61%) is substantially smaller than the annualized average
real rate of return on gross assets (5.72%). The diﬀerence, 2.11 %, is quite considerable.7
Moreover, if anything, the puzzle has increased over time. Our estimates indicate that the
average total return on assets during the Bretton Woods period (4.04%) was only 26 basis point
larger than the average total return on gross liabilities (3.78%). Since 1973, however, the gap has
widened enormously. The post Bretton Woods average asset return is 6.82% while the corresponding
total liability return is only 3.50%. The excess return reaches an astonishing 3.32% (see ﬁgure 7).
Hence, the ‘exorbitant privilege’ puzzle is reinforced when one looks at total returns.
We can use these historical averages to assess the tipping point beyond which we should expect
the US to pay more on its gross liabilities than it earns on its gross assets. The calculation, ﬁrst
proposed by Obstfeld and Taylor (2005), goes as follows. The tipping point is deﬁned as that ratio
of gross liabilities to gross assets beyond which ˜ raA − ˜ rlL becomes negative, where ˜ ra (resp. ˜ rl)
denotes an estimate of the nominal average total return on gross assets A (resp. liabilities L).
7These returns are reported in Table 1. For a study disentangling the eﬀect of capital gains, investment ﬂows and
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Figure 7: Annual real return on gross assets and gross liabilities. 1952-2004.
Using the nominal historical values of ˜ ra and ˜ rl, we estimate a tipping point L/A > ˜ ra/˜ rl =
1.30.8 The implication of the ‘exorbitant privilege’ is that a two percent excess return allows the
US to accumulate debt exceeding its gross assets by 30% and yet still be a recipient of positive
investment income. Since the exorbitant privilege of the US has increased over time, the tipping
point has also been pushed back substantially. Calculated using the average returns over the
Bretton Woods period, we estimate a tipping point of only 1.04. Using the post Bretton Woods
period estimates of returns, the tipping point now reaches an astonishing 1.43.
Interestingly, our estimates of the net foreign asset position of the US suggest that the leverage
ratio L/A has increased steadily over the period from 0.3 in 1952 to 0.73 in 1973, reached 1.09 in
1991, and ﬁnally 1.34 in 2004. Hence, the U.S. may be getting close to the position where it will
have to start making net payments to the rest of the world.
Of course, this simple computation ignores the endogeneity of the returns on gross assets and
liabilities. Reaching the “tipping point” where the US for the ﬁrst time since the second World War
ceases to have a positive net return on its net assets could be seen by the market as a signiﬁcant
blow to the credibility of the dollar. In a context where the external net worth of the US is negative
8The values of the nominal returns on assets and liabilities ˜ r
a and ˜ r
l a r er e s p e c t i v e l y :f o rt h ew h o l es a m p l e9 . 1 5 %
and 7.04%; for Bretton Woods: 6.32% and 6.06%; for the post -Bretton Woods period: 11.00% and 7.69%.
11and the return on its net assets also turns negative, market participants could start demanding a
higher premium on their dollar assets, thereby setting oﬀ unstable dynamics. This may also aﬀect
the structure of market participants’ borrowing: for example they could start to coordinate on
another international currency, such as the euro, to provide liquidity. They could also abandon
short-term low-yield US securities such as T-Bills for higher yielding assets (equity, FDI).9 This
would considerably change the external balance sheet of the US and narrow the gap between the
total return on US assets and liabilities, further deepening the adjustment problem. As the gap
between the return on gross assets and gross liabilities declines, the net interest burden would rise
rapidly, setting oﬀ further moves away from US assets. While this is a possible scenario, we stress
that understanding the dynamics of the composition of international portfolios, asset returns and
the exchange rate requires a dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy, which is
well beyond the scope of this paper.
4 The Exorbitant Privilege Part II: US as World Venture Capi-
talist
4.1 Composition of the gross asset and liability position.
We now turn our attention to the structure of gross assets and liabilities and its evolution over
time. This structure is particularly interesting in the case of the US, which has been the center
country of the Bretton Woods system since 1944 and has remained the most important ﬁnancial
center in the world, even after the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
The US has succeeded the United Kingdom as the ‘Banker of the World’ and the issuer of
the main international currency. This means in particular being able to borrow short (foreigners
are willing to purchase liquid dollar assets) and lend long (the US supplies long-term loans and
investment funds to foreign enterprises). Just like a bank, the US can extract an intermediation
margin, given by the (positive) return diﬀerential between external assets and liabilities. During
the whole period, US assets have shifted more and more out of long term bank loans towards FDI
and, since the 1990s, towards FDI and equity. At the same time, its liabilities have remained
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Figure 8: U.S. Gross External Assets (share of GDP), 1952-2004. Source: Author’s Calculations.
dominated by bank loans, trade credit and debt, i.e. low yield safe assets. Hence the US balance
sheet resembles increasingly one of a venture capitalist with high return risky investments on the
asset side. Furthermore, its leverage ratio has increased sizably over time.
The currency denomination of securities is also rather speciﬁc. The issuer of the international
currency is able to denominate its entire stock of liabilities in dollars, thereby shifting the exchange
rate exposure to the rest of the world. This key characteristic of the external balance sheet of the
US, shared to some extent by other developed countries, is instrumental in the stabilization of the
external accounts of these countries. As pointed out in Gourinchas and Rey (2005), a depreciation
of the US dollar has two beneﬁcial eﬀects on the external position. It helps to increase net exports
(trade adjustment channel), and it also increases the dollar value of US assets (valuation channel).
Figures 8 and 9 present our estimates of the ratio of each asset class to GDP. Several interesting
episodes can be read from these graphs: (i) the petrodollar recycling in the 70s until the Latin
American debt crisis of 1982 (see the large increase in ‘other assets’ -mostly bank loans over that
period— followed by a stagnation and a decrease); (ii) the erosion of the home bias in equity portfolios
at the end of the 1990s (particularly spectacular in the US asset portfolio); (iii) the bursting of the
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Figure 9: U.S. Gross External Liabilities (share of GDP), 1952-2004. Source: Author’s Calculations.
During the 1960s, the US was running moderate current account surpluses but was investing
sizable amounts abroad in the form of FDI. The share of FDI steadily increased between 1952 and
1973, from zero to 40% of gross external asset positions. On 4 February 1965 the French president
de Gaulle famously complained in a press conference at the Elys´ ee Palace that an increase in the
US money supply was leading to increased capital outﬂows from the US and “for some countries to
a sort of expropriation of their enterprises.” For de Gaulle, the role of the dollar as the international
currency meant that the US could borrow money from the rest of the world “free of charge.” By
printing dollars and using them to purchase foreign companies, it was claimed, the US was abusing
its hegemonic position at the center of the international monetary system. But these long- term
capital outﬂows led to a continuous drain of the US gold reserves, despite the numerous and futile
attempts by the US to limit the size of the balance of payments deﬁcit. This is visible in Figure
8 where a sharp increase in FDI assets is matched almost one for one by a decrease in “other”
assets. As ﬁgure 10 documents, a substantial share of the decline in other assets was due to
the drain on US gold reserves. Successive US administrations used various expedients such as the
interest equalization tax, “voluntary” restraint programs, restrictions on tourism, oﬀset agreements
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Figure 10: US Other Gross Assets and Gold (share of GDP), 1952-2004.
Japan) to prevent dollars held abroad from being converted into gold. Despite these interventions,
the credibility of the convertibility of the dollar waned over time and the tensions on the foreign
exchange markets culminated in 1970 and 1972-73 with successive runs on the dollar that triggered
the collapse of the ﬁxed exchange rate system of Bretton Woods.
The abandonment of gold parity, however, did not lead to the demise of the dollar as the main
international currency.10 The US has remained the world liquidity provider ever since. As shown
in Figure 11 the share of liquid liabilities (deﬁned as debt, trade credits and bank loans) in total US
liabilities has gone down only slightly from roughly 70% in 1973 to around 60% in 2004 (the decrease
of the end of the 1990s is due to the equity bubble). This constitutes a remarkably high share of
total liabilities and reﬂects the high demand in the rest of the world for liquid US securities as a
transaction medium, reserves or store of value both during Bretton Woods and after the collapse
of the ﬁxed exchange rate regime.
Over the same period, the share of high yield risky investment increased considerably. From a
conservative world banker, the US became a bold world venture capitalist. The share of risky assets
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Figure 11: Share of risky assets in all assets, share of liquid liabilities in all liabilities (1952-2004).
in total assets increased continuously during the Bretton Woods era, as growing FDI outﬂows led
to a decrease in gold reserves. This gold drain was stopped in 1973 once the Nixon Administration
decided to end the convertibility of the dollar. After the emerging market debt crisis of the 1980s
and the deregulation of equity markets of the 1990s, the growth in FDI and portfolio equity ﬂows
gathered pace so that by 2004, the share of risky assets in the total asset portfolio of the US reached
about 60%, against roughly 50% in 1973. Hence the collapse of Bretton Woods has not deprived
the US of its fundamental role as world liquidity provider. This upward trend in the share of high
yielding risky assets is consistent with the increase over time of the (positive) return diﬀerential
between assets and liabilities, as documented in the previous section.11
4.2 Total returns
The yields that the US receivess on its external assets are higher that the yields that it pays on its
liabilities. In the previous section, we showed that this is also true for the aggregate total returns on
the net foreign asset position of the US. We now look at total returns on gross assets and liabilities
and on each class of assets independently. Table 1 presents estimates of average total real annual
11It would be of great interest to compare the balance sheet of the US to those of other developed countries more
precisely. This is the undertaking of Obstfeld and Taylor (2005).
16Panel 1a Summary Statistics (1952:1-2004:1)
T o t a lr e a lr e t u r n s ra rl rae raf rad rao rle rlf rld rlo
Mean (%) 5.72 3.61 13.68 9.57 4.35 3.43 10.28 9.56 0.51 1.19
St. Deviation (%) 11.98 10.49 39.76 23.10 15.94 9.33 36.70 24.18 13.09 4.91
Sharpe Ratio (%) 47.73 34.40 34.39 41.43 27.31 36.78 28.02 39.56 3.87 24.29
Panel 1b Summary Statistics (1952:1-1973:1)
Total real returns ra rl rae raf rad rao rle rlf rld rlo
Mean (%) 4.04 3.78 10.83 9.44 4.82 2.40 11.59 9.96 0.80 1.24
St. Deviation (%) 4.79 9.60 36.83 16.32 17.67 1.75 36.29 21.33 10.66 1.32
Sharpe Ratio (%) 84.51 39.34 29.41 57.85 27.29 137.10 31.93 46.68 7.47 94.63
Panel 1c Summary Statistics (1973:1-2004:1)
Total real returns ra rl rae raf rad rao rle rlf rld rlo
Mean (%) 6.82 3.50 15.54 9.65 4.05 4.11 9.43 9.31 0.32 1.16
St. Deviation (%) 14.84 11.07 41.61 26.69 14.77 11.89 37.09 25.96 14.50 6.24
Sharpe Ratio (%) 45.91 31.60 37.35 36.16 27.40 34.54 25.43 35.85 2.19 18.58
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Average quarterly total real returns (annualized)
returns on the diﬀerent subcomponents of assets and liabilities for the whole sample, the Bretton
Woods period and the Floating Exchange Rate Regime.12 We denote by ra, the return on gross
assets, rl the return on gross liabilities, rae the return on equities, rad the return on debt, raf the
return on FDI and rao the return on “others” (all returns are real). Symmetrically, rle denote the
return on foreigners’ holdings of US equity (in other words, US equity liabilities), rlf the return on
FDI liability, rld and rlo the return on debt and other liability respectively.
Several features are noteworthy. First, as we already mentioned, over the whole period, the US
gained a sizable excess return in real terms on assets over liabilities (2.11% = 5.72%−3.61%). This
excess return is especially large during the ﬂoating exchange rate period (between 1973 and 2004,
it is equal to 3.32% in real terms). Considering each asset in turn, the US earns an average of 340
bp excess return yearly on its equity assets (rae vs rle), 384 bp on its debt (rad vs rld) and 214 bp
on its bank loan and trade credits (rao vs rlo). By contrast, the US does not seem to enjoy sizable
superior returns on its direct investment abroad. The excess return is only one bp (raf vs rlf).
Second, there is a sizable gap between returns on the “safe assets” (debt and others) and the
returns on risky assets (equity and FDI). During the 1950s and the 1960s, foreigners earned a very
12See Appendix B.3 for details on how we computed the returns.
17low real return on US debt (0.80% on average): de Gaulle was not that far oﬀ when he was talking
of the US debt being “free of charge”. With the advent of the ﬂoating exchange rate regime, the
real returns on debt became even lower (0.32% on average).
Third, the volatility of all returns has increased signiﬁcantly after the collapse of Bretton Woods
so that the sharpe ratios of assets have in general declined during the ﬂoating exchange rate regime.
4.3 A break-up of total returns
The large positive excess real return of gross assets over gross liabilities can be broken up into
a composition eﬀect and a return eﬀect. US liabilities are dominated by low yield safe securities
whereas US assets contain a large (and increasing over time) share of FDI and equity. The US
can be therefore characterized as a very leveraged investor, which is increasingly shorting low-yield
securities to buy high-yield investments. This is the composition eﬀect. But there is also a return
eﬀect. Within each class of assets, the preceding discussion showed that the US earned higher
returns on its assets than on its liabilities. This price eﬀect represents the other dimension of the
‘exorbitant privilege’ and could occur in particular because of a liquidity discount for the issuer of
the international currency, as discussed in Portes and Rey (1998). Formally, we can decompose the
return on assets ra and the return on liabilities rl as:
ra = µaerae + µadrad + µafraf + µaorao
rl = µlerle + µldrld + µlfrlf + µalrlo
where µae , µaf,µ ao and µad are the weights on equity, FDI, other foreign assets (bank loans and
trade credit) and debt in total assets. Notations for the liability side are deﬁn e di na ne n t i r e l y
symmetric fashion.
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18Return eﬀect Composition Eﬀect Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) Total (5) (6) (7) Total ra − rl
Period Other Debt Equity FDI (1) to (4) Debt Equity FDI (5) to (7) (1) to (7)
1952-2004 1.00 0.56 0.35 0.06 1.97 0.03 -0.59 0.70 0.14 2.11
1952-1973 0.69 0.38 0.04 0.12 1.23 -0.23 -1.46 0.73 -0.96 0.27
1973-2004 1.21 0.68 0.55 0.01 2.45 0.20 -0.02 0.68 0.86 3.32
Table 2: Break-up of Total Real Returns in a Price and a Composition Eﬀect
where E denotes the expectation sign, ¯ µi =
¡
µai + µli¢
/2 is the average portfolio share for asset
class i and ¯ ri =
¡
rai + rli¢
/2 is the average return on asset class i. The ﬁrst four terms represent
the return eﬀect. They denote the average excess return on external assets relative to liabilities
within each class of assets. This return eﬀect is zero if the return is the same within each asset
class (rai = rli).
The last three terms represent the composition eﬀect. It quantiﬁes the diﬀerence in weights
between assets and liabilities for equity, FDI and debt. The composition eﬀect is zero if US external
assets have the same composition as US external liabilities (µai = µli).13
In Table 2, we analyze the relative importance of the composition and return eﬀects in explaining
the high return enjoyed by the US on its net foreign asset position. All the returns are in percentage
terms.
We ﬁrst observe that the return eﬀect plays a dominant part in explaining the excess return of
t h eU Sn e tf o r e i g na s s e tp o r t f o l i o . W eﬁnd that it accounts for 1.97 percent of the 2.11 percent
total excess return over the entire sample, 1.23 percent during the Bretton Woods period and 2.45
percent since 1973. The return eﬀect is especially signiﬁcant for the short term liquid assets (other
and debt) where it accounts for about half of the total excess return (1.56 percent of the total 2.11




li are time-varying. Hence the overall excess return depends also upon the covariance
between asset returns and shares.
19The composition eﬀect plays a smaller role over the entire sample (0.14 percent), but its rel-
evance has increased signiﬁcantly over time, from -0.96 percent before 1973 to 0.86 percent since
then. Hence, between a quarter and a third of the current excess return (3.32 percent) can be
explained by the asymmetry in the US external balance sheet and the fact that the US earns an
equity premium. Looking at the subcomponents of this composition eﬀect, we ﬁnd that most of it
arises from the asymmetry in direct investment (0.70 percent). The increased contribution of the
composition term, however, reﬂects mostly the increased symmetry in equity positions (from -1.46
percent to -0.02 percent) reﬂecting the decrease of home bias in US portfolios (the share of foreign
equity in US portfolios has risen over time).
5 Exchange rate adjustment
Current external imbalances can be compensated either by future trade surpluses or by future
favorable returns on the net foreign asset position of the US. In this section, we perform a simple
exercise, meant to illustrate the joint capacity of the valuation channel and of the more traditional
trade channel to stabilize the external accounts of the US. Gourinchas and Rey (2005) show that
the valuation channel operates at short to medium horizons while the trade channel operates in the
medium to long run. Historically the valuation channel has contributed around 30% of the process
of international adjustment.
5.1 Theory
We start from the law of accumulation of foreign assets between t and t +1:
NFAt+1 ≡ Rt+1 NFAt + NXt+1 (1)
where NXt represents net exports, deﬁned as the diﬀerence between exports Xt and imports
Mt a n dn e tf o r e i g na s s e t sNFAt is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between gross foreign assets At and
gross foreign liabilities Lt, measured in domestic currency at the end of period t. Equation (1)
states that the net foreign position increases with net exports and with the total return on the
net foreign asset portfolio Rt+1. Dividing through by US GDP Yt, and using lower case letters to




nfat + nxt+1 (2)
where gt+1 represents the growth rate of output between t and t +1 .
Net exports and the return on the net foreign asset positions are both aﬀected by movements in
the exchange rate. In the case of the US, a dollar depreciation helps on both counts. It stimulates
net exports and it increases the dollar value of US assets thereby improving the return on the net
foreign asset position. This is because most US liabilities are in dollars whereas a share of US assets
are in foreign currency.14 We estimate the magnitude of a devaluation needed, ceteris paribus, for
the US net foreign debt and the US net exports to satisfy the following long run equilibrium (steady








where variables without time subscript denote steady state values. Numerically, we equate g to
the historical average of real GDP growth (1.033 per year in gross term). R is the steady state
rate of return on the net foreign asset position. From Gourinchas and Rey (2005), we know that
R = g/ρ where ρ is a growth-adjusted discount factor, a function of steady state weights on exports,
imports, assets and liabilities. Empirically, Gourinchas and Rey (2005) found that ρ =0 .95. Hence
we assume that R =1 .033/0.95 = 1.0874 (the net steady state return on the net foreign asset
position is therefore equal to 8.74%). Given these estimates, we ﬁn dal o n gr u nr a t i oo fn e te x p o r t s
to net foreign assets equal to nx/nfa =1− R/g = −5.26%.
Next, we need to quantify the eﬀect of an exchange rate depreciation on net exports and on the
net foreign asset portfolio return. Estimates in the literature imply that a 1% increase in the ratio
of net exports to GDP requires a depreciation of 11 to 20% of the exchange rate (see Blanchard,
Giavazzi and Sa (2005)). We pick two estimates: a middle range estimate of 15% and a low estimate





14In constrast, for an emerging market with dollarized liabilities, a depreciation will be destabilizing.
21where η is taken to be 1/15 or 1/10.
We now assess the eﬀect of a change in the exchange rate on the ﬁrst term on the right hand




In the absence of a general equilibrium model of portfolio allocation and equilibrium returns, we
make the assumption that the asset composition of the net foreign asset position remains constant
relative to GDP over the period considered. Hence the response of the net foreign asset position
to changes in the exchange rate is solely determined by the response of the returns on assets and




We use historical data of the ﬂoating exchange rate period to estimate the elasticity of the
dollar returns on gross assets and liabilities to the exchange rate for a given horizon h.T od os o ,














t,h denotes the annualized net returns on gross assets and rl
t,h the annualized net return on
gross liabilities at horizon h while det,h/et,h is the annualized rate of depreciation between t and
t + h. These regressions use quarterly data for the 1973-2004 sample. The results are reported in
Table 3, for horizons between 1 and 5 years, with standard errors in parentheses.
We ﬁnd that depreciations are associated with signiﬁcantly larger returns on gross assets and
(marginally signiﬁcantly) lower returns on gross liabilities. This indicates potentially powerful
valuation eﬀects.
22Horizon h (years) Horizon h (years)
h = 135h = 135
βh
a 0.28 0.26 0.19 βh
l -0.08 -0.15 -0.14
s.e. (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) s.e. (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
¯ ra
h 6.64% 6.96% 7.52% ¯ rl
h 3.6% 4.04% 4.44%
(annualized) (annualized)
Table 3: Elasticities of Asset and Liability Returns to Exchange Rate Changes
Given these (admittedly) reduced-form relations, we can now estimate the magnitude of the
depreciation needed for the US to satisfy the steady state relation linking its net foreign asset posi-
tion to its net exports within an horizon of h years. To do so, we start by writing the accumulation


















Assuming that we reach the steady state in t + h, so that nfat+h = nfa and nxt+h = nx, and



































The ﬁrst term on the right hand side reﬂects the impact of the change in the exchange rate on the
net foreign asset position (the valuation eﬀect). The second term represents the cumulated impact
of the depreciation on the trade balance (the trade balance eﬀect).
Finally, we observe that in the steady state nfa = nx/(1 − R/g)=[ nxt + hη de/e]/(1 − R/g).
Putting everything together, we can solve for the annual depreciation rate that restores the long




































The required rate of depreciation depends upon the horizon h, the trade elasticity η, the semi-
15This assumes that the growth rate of the US economy is unaﬀected by the change in the exchange rate. Obviously,
this is a strong assumption.
23Horizon h (years)
h = 13 5
η =1 /15
Annual depreciation to
Long run equilibrium (percent) 74.6 26.3 17.8
Long run trade balance 0.18 0.46 1.15
(percent, relative to GDP)
Long run Net Foreign Asset position -3.3 -8.7 -21.9
(percent, relative to GDP)
η =1 /10
Annual depreciation to 52.9 18.7 12.6
Long run equilibrium (percent)
Long run trade balance 0.49 0.82 1.48
(percent, relative to GDP)
Long run Net Foreign Asset position -9.3 -15.6 -28.1
(percent, relative to GDP)
Table 4: Depreciations required to go to the long run equilibrium
elasticity of returns to the exchange rate (βh
a and βh
l ) as well as the initial trade balance (nxt)a n d
gross foreign asset positions (at and lt).
5.2 Numerical Application
We use data from 2004 for the net foreign asset to GDP ratio (nat = −26%), the net export to
GDP ratio (nxt = −4.8%),the ratio of gross assets over GDP (at = 76%) and the ratio of gross
liabilities over GDP (lt = 103%). Returns and elasticity of returns to exchange rate changes are
taken from Table 3 for the relevant horizon.
Table 4 reveals that a return to equilibrium in one year would require an implausible depreciation
of 75 percent. Such a large depreciation would turn around the trade balance from -4.8 percent to
0.18 percent. However, the main direct eﬀect of the that depreciation would be to wipe out most
of the net foreign liabilities of the US. The long run net foreign assets would stabilize around -3.3
percent. Of course, it is rather implausible that the asset composition of international portfolios
would remain constant in the face of such a major change in relative prices.
Going back to the long run equilibrium in three years instead would require a depreciation of
26 percent per year while a return to equilibrium in ﬁve years would requires a depreciation of 18
24percent per year. An extended adjustment period implies that the US would be running current
account deﬁcits -and accumulate foreign debt- for a longer time. This has two implications. First,
the long run value of the net foreign debt remains quite substantial. In fact, we ﬁnd that if the
adjustment takes ﬁve years, the net foreign debt will still represent 22 percent of GDP, only slightly
down from its current value of 26 percent. Second this requires a more substantial turnaround in
next exports. We ﬁnd that the trade balance would have to reach a surplus of 0.46 percent each
year at a three year horizon, or 1.15 percent at ﬁve years.
A higher elasticity of exports allows for a smaller depreciation of the exchange rate. When
η =1 /10, the depreciation at one year is ‘only’ 53%, and drops to 13% per year for a ﬁve year
adjustment. The equilibrium trade balance exhibits a larger surplus and the net foreign asset debt
remains comparably larger (28% at 5 years).
There is of course no theoretical reason to assume that the US net foreign asset position should
go back to its long run equilibrium in one or three or ﬁve years. In Gourinchas and Rey (2005)
we base our forecasts of exchange rate depreciation on historical adjustment speeds and predict
smaller rates of depreciation. But the type of exercise that we have undertaken here could be seen
as estimating the necessary exchange rate depreciation in the event of exogenous shocks on capital
ﬂows that could force the US net foreign asset position to adjust suddenly.16
6 Concluding Remarks: Current Issues in Light of the Bretton
Woods Debates.
The main objective of this paper is to bring new data to bear on the question of the external ad-
justment process of the US. We constructed a quarterly dataset of US external assets and liabilities
at market value going back to 1952. We showed that the US has always faced a weakened external
constraint. In particular, it has consistently been able to borrow on quite favorable terms and
earn a signiﬁcant premium on its provision of global liquidity. Perhaps surprisingly, this ability has
strengthened over time, despite the runs on the dollar of the seventies and the demise of the ﬁxed
exchange rate system.
16See Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (2004) for another example.
25In this context, we ﬁnd it instructive to revisit the intellectual debates of the 1960s regarding
the US ‘balance of payments problem’. We are certainly not the ﬁrst ones to point out interesting
parallels between the challenges of the Bretton Woods system and the current global imbalances (see
Dooley, Folkerts-Landau and Garber (2003), Eichengreen (2004)). Our contribution is merely to
point out what our revised estimates of the US external positions have to say about both historical
and current debates.
Broadly speaking, we identify three strands of analysis of the current situation, with their
parallels in the 1960s. The ﬁrst strand puts the blame squarely on the subordination of US economic
policies to domestic objectives, at the expense of external adjustment. In the 1960s, many argued,
the US was unwilling to pursue the tight monetary policy that would have been required to prevent
the drain on gold reserves. Instead, the US adopted indirect policy initiatives (interest equalization
tax, oﬀset ‘agreements’, import surcharge) that were designed speciﬁcally to free monetary policy
from its external constraint. In the current context, this line of thought emphasizes the impact
of the recent string of ﬁscal deﬁcits (Bush tax cuts, military expenditures) on national savings
(Roubini and Setser (2004))
Seen in the broader perspective that our data analysis allows, it is not clear that this can be
the whole story. Since 1973, and the decoupling of the US dollar from gold, the dollar exchange
rates has been largely free to adjust and restore external stability -if need be- through the usual
channels of adjustment. Yet, what do we observe since 1973? First, a stabilization, even an
improvement between 1975 and 1980, where the ratio of net assets to GDP climbs back to its
1960s level (10 percent). But this is followed by an unprecedented slide between 1980 and 2004,
from 10 percent to -26 percent of GDP. Looking at the ﬁgure, the Bretton Woods era looks like a
period of relatively modest balance of payments imbalances.17 While domestic ﬁscal and monetary
developments certainly play a role, we are struck by the secular decline in net foreign assets across
the Reagan combination of ﬁscal deﬁcits and tight money, the Clinton era of ﬁscal rectitude and
surging asset prices, to the current descent into ﬁscal deﬁcits and lax monetary policy.
17This is in part due to the fact that the external constraint manifested itself on a small subset of the overall
external balance sheet of the US, the Oﬃcial Settlement Balance. The US exper i e n c e dag o l dd r a i ne v e nt h o u g hi t
was running small current account surpluses over that period. But the larger point that the overall external portfolio
of the US did not deteriorate much over that period is still valid.
26A second line of thought emphasized the unique role of the US as the provider of the main
international currency and liquidity. In 1966, Despres et al. argued that the US was the world
banker. It provided safe low yield assets to world savers with a preference for liquidity. In exchange,
US investors, with a lower taste for liquidity, saw investment opportunities in the rest of the world
in the form of long term loans. This line of thought has two modern incarnations. The ﬁrst
variation puts the emphasis on the central banks of developing countries and their incentive to
subsidize US consumption by accumulating US treasury bills (Dooley et al. (2003)). The second
variation is very much in the spirit of the original Despres et al. (1966) analysis. It sees the US
as a provider of safe ﬁnancial assets to the rest of the world (Bernanke (2005), Cooper (2004)).
Following the Asian and Russian crisis, the high savings from emerging economies looked for a safe
and liquid haven. US assets, especially treasuries, provided the perfect vehicle. As we show, there
is substantial evidence that the US does indeed perform the functions of a liquidity provider. This
is perhaps even more the case since the liberalization of ﬁnancial markets that allow equity and
direct investment in emerging economies. From world banker, the US has become, for all intents
and purposes, the world venture capitalist!
Yet, that analysis does not imply that the current situation can be maintained indeﬁnitely. In
fact, our analysis of the tipping point indicates that while the US is still some ways away from
making net payments on its mounting stock of net liabilities, that moment is approaching. Foreign
lenders could decide to stop ﬁnancing the US external deﬁcit and run away from the dollar, either
in favor of another currency such as the Euro, or just as dramatically, require a risk premium on
US liquid assets whose safety could not be guaranteed any longer. In either case, the repercussions
could be quite severe, with a decline in the value of the dollar, higher domestic interest rates and
yields, and a global recession.
The previous discussion points to a possible instability, even in an international monetary
system that lacks a formal anchor. The relevant reference here is Triﬃn’s prescient work on the
fundamental instability of the Bretton Woods system (see Triﬃn (1960)). Triﬃn saw that in a world
where the ﬂuctuations in gold supply were dictated by the vagaries of discoveries in South Africa or
the destabilizing schemes of Soviet Russia, but in any case unable to grow with world demand for
liquidity, the demand for the dollar was bound to eventually exceed the gold reserves of the Federal
27Reserve. This left the door open for a run on the dollar. Interestingly, the current situation can be
seen in a similar light: in a world where the US can supply the international currency at will, and
invests it in illiquid assets, it still faces a conﬁdence risk. There could be a run on the dollar not
because investors would fear an abandonment of the gold parity, as in the seventies, but because
they would fear a plunge in the dollar exchange rate. In other words, Triﬃn ’ sa n a l y s i sd o e sn o t
have to rely on the gold-dollar parity to be relevant. Gold or not, the specter of the Triﬃnd i l e m m a
may still be haunting us!
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30Appendix A
Detailed Description of the Construction of the International Investment
Position for the U.S.
A.1 Overview of Data Issues and Methodology
In order to evaluate the extent and the nature of US external imbalances, one needs an accurate measure of
the international investment position (IIP) of the US. A major drawback of the oﬃcial balance of payments
statistics is the absence of valuation in the current account measures. This implies that if one were to simply
cumulate the current account to compute the net foreign asset position of the United States, one would get
a biased estimate.
Data on the net and gross foreign asset position of the U.S. is available from two sources: the U.S.
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) and the Federal Reserve Flows of Funds
Accounts (FFA) for the rest of the world. The BEA reports annually its International Investment Position
of the United States. The IIP details gross and net foreign asset positions at the end of the year since 1976.
In addition, the BEA reports quarterly ﬂow data in the US International Transactions (USIT) tables since
1960 for some ﬂow series, 1982 for others.18 The BEA data uses Balance of Payment concepts, in accordance
with the IMF’s Manual of the Balance of Payments (1993). Following oﬃcial classiﬁcations, we split U.S.
net foreign portfolio into four categories: Debt (corporate and government bonds), Equity, Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) and Other. The ‘other’ category includes mostly bank loans and trade credits. The BEA
data provide equity and FDI (since 1980) ﬁgures at market value and perform an exchange rate adjustment
for debt. The quality of the data is good.19
For its part, the Federal Reserve publishes since 1952 the quarterly ﬂo w sa n dp o s i t i o n sf o rt h e“ r e s t
of the world” account, as part of its Flow of Funds accounts. While covering a longer sample, the FFA
data presents two drawbacks. First, equity positions are the only series recorded at market value. Debt,
FDI and ‘Other’ claims and liabilities are recorded at historical costs. Second, the FFA data is of poorer
quality and uses National Income and Product Account (NIPA) concepts that diﬀer subtly from their BoP
equivalent. But the primary source data are often similar, except for a few items such:20 (i) the treatment
of international banking facilities (IBF) and (ii) the treatment of the Netherlands Antilles Aﬃliates. An
IBF is a set of “books” maintained by a US bank that are not subject to domestic banking regulations.
They allow US banks to oﬀer oﬀshore banking services “onshore”. The BEA considers that IBF are “inside”
the US while the FFA consider that they are foreign residents. As to the second point, the BEA treats all
transactions between parents and aﬃliates as part of Direct Investment. Instead, the FFA treats these ﬂows
as part of corporate debt liabilities.
Our approach was to supplement the BEA’s IIP data for all categories of assets and liabilities, and each
point in time back to 1952, using Survey of Current Business reported holdings for Equity and Debt, BEA
and FFA ﬂow data, US Treasury benchmark surveys on holdings, and by constructing valuation adjustments
for each subcategories of assets and liabilities. In this appendix, we describe in detail our methodology for
constructing the gross asset and liability positions of the US on a quarterly basis since 1952. In particular
we provide a reconciliation of the data treatment of the Flow of Funds and the BEA.
Denote PX t the end of period t position for some asset category X. We use the following updating
equation:
PXt = PXt−1 + FXt + DXt (A.1)
18For instance, equity and debt ﬂows are available separately after 1982 only.
19Technically, the BEA provides data on FDI at market value since 1982. However, the IMF constructed market
value positions for 1980 and 1981. We use these estimates in our analysis.
The Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001) data set includes annual data since 1973 and coincides with the BEA data
after 1980.
20See Hooker and Wilson (1989) for a detailed comparison.
31where FXt denotes the ﬂows corresponding to asset X that enters the balance of payments, and DXt denotes
a discrepancy reﬂecting a market valuation adjustment between periods t−1a n dt. When we cannot measure
DXt directly, we construct an estimate as rx
t PXt−1 where rx
t represents the estimated dollar capital gain on
category X between time t − 1a n dt i m et. Our approach therefore requires that we specify market returns
rx
t for each sub-category of the Financial Account.
Data in the ﬁnal quarter of each year are mapped to the International Investment Position (IIP) data
of the BEA, when available.21 Therefore, the valuation term between the third and fourth quarters includes
all adjustments not captured by our valuation method, such as change in the coverage of the series.
A.2 Reconciliation of the Flow of Funds and the BEA data.
A.2.1 Mapping the ﬂows
The material in this section draws heavily from Hooker and Wilson (1989). It is important to understand
why and how the FFA and BEA data diﬀer. First and foremost, one should realize that the BEA and FFA
data are essentially compiled from the same source data. The main diﬀerences lie in the deﬁnition of the
various concepts (NIPA vs BoP), their geographical coverage, and the treatment of valuation eﬀects. This
appendix clariﬁes the points relevant to our analysis.
To establish a correspondence between FFA and BEA, we start from the Balance of Payment’s identity:
CA+ KA+ FA+ SD =0 ( A . 2 )
where CA denotes the U.S. current account (USIT Table 1 line 76), KA the U.S. capital account (Table
1 line 39), FA denotes the ﬁnancial account (Table 1 line 40 and 55) and SD the statistical discrepancy
(errors and omissions, Table 1 line 70).22
The equivalent accounting identity in the FFA takes the following form:23
CA0 + KA0 + FA0 + SD0 =0 ( A . 3 )
where CA0 denotes the NIPA’s current account (FFA Table F107 line 5 minus line 1), KA0 is the (NIPA)
net capital transfers (Table F107 line 8 with sign reversed), FA 0 denotes NIPA’s Net Financial Investment
(Table F107 line 12) and SD0 denotes the (NIPA) statistical discrepancy (Table F107 line 55). KA0 is equal
to KA, so that we can combine (A.2) and (A.3) to obtain:
SD0 =( CA− CA0)+( FA− FA0)+SD (A.4)
The NIPA statistical discrepancy SD0 is equal to the BoP statistical discrepancy SD plus an adjustment for
the diﬀerence in the deﬁnitions of the current and ﬁnancial accounts in the NIPA and BoP respectively.
N e x t ,w ed e c o m p o s et h eﬁnancial accounts FA0 and FAas follows:
FA0 = FA0
f − FA 0
us
FA = FAf + FA us
where FA0
f (resp. FAf) represents the change in foreign-owned U.S. assets (gross liabilities) in the FFA
(resp. the BoP) and FA 0
us (resp FAus) represents the change in U.S.-owned assets abroad (gross assets) in
21The only exception is for Direct Investment. The reason is that when we extend the valuation adjustment used
by the BEA before 1980, we end up with negative gross positions before 1970. This could come from an imperfect
accounting of reinvested earnings. According to the Balance of Payments manual, direct investment income in the
current account includes distributed earnings as well as the share of reinvested earnings with an oﬀsetting entry in
the ﬁnancial account. This implies that reinvested earnings are included in the ﬂow FX t and should be excluded
from the return r
x
t in equation (A.1). We adjusted the valuation terms to replicate the BEA’s annual adjustment
from 1982 onward but chose to start both FDI gross asset and liabilities position at 0 at the beginning of our sample
and update (A.1) forward.
22All line references in USIT Table 1 and FFA Table F107 are accurate as of January 2005.
23Note that we write this equation from the point of view of the U.S., while the FFA is from the perspective of the
rest of the world. So CA
0 is the opposite of the current account recorded in the FFA.
32the FFA (resp. the BoP).24 The Guide to the Flows of Funds (2000) (pp370-380) establishes the following
correspondence between FA0
f and FAf :
FA 0
f = FAf + Gold and SDR (F107 line 14) (A.5)
+net issuance of bonds by Netherland Antillean subsidiaries (F107 line 27b)
−change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107 lines 15f to 15l)
Accordingly, gross external liabilities according to the BEA and the FFA exhibit three diﬀerences:
1. The FFA treats transactions involving Gold and SDR as changes in foreign assets, while the BEA
treats them as changes in U.S. assets. In the FFA, Gold and SDR (F107 line 14) corresponds to sales
of Gold and SDR by the U.S. (USIT Table 1 lines 42 and 43), with the sign reversed.
2. In the late 1970s and 1980s, some U.S. corporations established ﬁnancial subsidiaries in the Netherland
Antilles to tap international capital markets and avoid capital control and tax laws. The subsidiary
would issue Eurobonds and channel the funds back to the U.S. parent company. The Balance of
Payments considers all transactions between parent and aﬃliates as part of Direct Investment and
subtracts issuance of eurobonds by foreign ﬁnancial subsidiaries from direct investment outﬂows. By
contrast, the FFA treats these capital ﬂows as direct bond issuance by the U.S parent companies, adds
them to bond liabilities and adds them back to foreign direct investment outﬂows.25 The removal of
the withholding tax in 1984 eliminated the incentive to use overseas subsidiaries to issue Eurobonds.
The FFA practice was discontinued in 1992Q4.
3. The FFA nets interbank claims while the BEA reports claims on a gross basis.26 In order to map back
the FFA to the BEA, we need to subtract the “changes in net interbank claims on foreigners” (lines
15f to 15l).
Further, FA0
us must satisfy the key identity (A.3), given SD0:
FA 0
us = FA 0
f + CA0 + KA0 + SD0 (A.6)
The last piece of the puzzle is the deﬁnition of SD0 in the FFA given by:
SD0 (F107 line 55) = − CA0 − KA0 (F107 line 8 with minus sign) (A.7)
+SD (F107 line 55a)
+CA (F107 line 55b with opposite sign)
Combining with equation (A.4), we obtain:
FA0 = FA+ KA
In words, the FFA net investment position includes the BEA capital transfers.
Combining (A.7) and (A.6), we extract FA 0
us as:
FA0
us = −FAus − KA
+Gold and SDR (F107 line 14)
+Net issuance of bonds by Net. Ant. subsidiaries (F107 line 27b)
−change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107 lines 15f to 15l)
24with the BoP convention that FA us < 0 when there is a gross capital outﬂow.
25This assumes that the bond issue is purchased entirely by the rest of the world.
26Net interbank claims (F107 line 15) = interbank liabilities (F107 lines 15a-e) - interbank claims (F107 lines 15f-l).
An additional distinction comes from the treatment of International Banking Facilities, counted as domestic entities
in the BoP and foreign entities in the FFA. We lump this term with the change in interbank claims on foreigners.
33To summarize, the asset ﬂow side has the same adjustments as the ﬂow liability side, plus the subtraction
of the capital account transactions.
In order to construct a measure of the U.S. international investment position comparable with existing
measures, we adopt the BEA’s classiﬁcation. Accordingly, we adopt the following decomposition for gross
assets and liabilities:
FAf = FEL+ FDL+ FFL+ FOL
with:
FAf = Foreign-owned assets in the US (Table 1 line 55)
FEL = Equity (Table 7a line B4 and memo line 4)
FDL = Debt (Table 7a line 16, 30 and memo line 3)
FFL = Direct investment (Table 1 line 64)
and
−FAus = FEA+ FDA+ FFA+ FOA
with
FAus = U.S.-owned assets abroad, Table 1 line 40
FEA = Equity (Table 7a line A4)
FDA = Debt (Table 7a line 18)
FFA = Direct investment (Table 1 line 51)
We have similar deﬁnitions for the FFA based gross ﬂows:
FA0
f = FEL0 + FDL0 + FFL0 + FOL0
with
FA0
f = Net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets (Table F107 line 13)
FEL0 = Equity (Table F107 line 29)
FDL0 = Debt (Table F107 line 21, 24 and 27)
FFL0 = Direct investment (Table F107 line 33)
as well as for FA 0
us :
FA0
us = FEA0 + FDA 0 + FFA0 + FOA0
with
FA0
us = Net increase in liabilities of the rest of the world (Table 107 line 35)
FEA0 = Equity (Table 107 line 47)
FDA0 = Debt (Table 107 line 40)
FFA0 = Direct investment (Table 107 line 53)
34According to the Guide to the Flow of Funds (2000), the FFA and BoP series satisfy:
FDL0 = FDL
+net issuance of bonds by Net. Ant. subsidiaries (F107 line 27b)
FEL0 = FEL
FFL0 = FFL
FEA 0 = FEA
FDA 0 = FDA
FFA 0 = FFA
+net issuance of bonds by Net. Ant. subsidiaries (F107 line 27b)
from which we conclude that:
FOL0 = FOL+ Gold and SDR (F107 line 14)
−change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107 lines 15f to 15l)
FOA0 = FOA− KA
+Gold and SDR (F107 line 14)
−change in interbank claims on foreigners (F107 lines 15f-15l)
Appendix B presents a line by line description of the mapping.
A.2.2 The Dynamics of the External Budget Constraint.







t represents the position at the end of period t for series i, FXi
t the ﬂow during period (BEA
deﬁnition) t and DXi
t ad i s c o n t i n u i t yr e ﬂecting a market valuation adjustment or a change of coverage in
the series between t−1a n dt. Summing across all the series, we obtain the international investment position






































































= CAt + SDt + KAt
where we used the fundamental BoP equation. Substituting,












is the net discrepancy. In the case where there is no change in coverage of the data, this net discrepancy
corresponds to the capital gains. Further, we can write the current account as follows:
CAt = NXt + It + UTt
where It denotes net income receipts (including interest income, distributed dividends and FDI earnings) ,
and UTt represents unilateral transfers plus net compensation of employees.27 The sum of It+1 and NDt+1
represents the total return on the net foreign asset portfolio between t and t+1, (Rt+1 − 1)NFAt.W ec a n
then rewrite the accumulation equation as:
NFAt+1 = Rt+1NFAt + NXt+1 + UTt+1 + KAt+1 + SDt+1
Appendix B
Line by Line Description, Flows, Positions and Return Data.
The remainder of this appendix presents a line by line account of the construction of the US international
investment position of the US, from 1952:1 to 2004:1.
List of acronyms:
BEA Bureau of Economic Analysis (Department of Commerce)
FFA Flow of Funds (Federal Reserve)
USIT U.S. International Transactions, BEA, BoP concepts
IIP U.S. International Investment Position, BEA, BoP concepts




∗ After 1982Q1 from BEA (USIT Table 7b line A2 before 1998Q1 then USIT Table 7a line
A4).
∗ Before 1982, from FFA, table F107 line 47 (FU263164003.Q, foreign corporate equities,
including ADRs, NSA). Before 1974Q1, the FFA series reports incorrectly the sum of equity
and debt holdings by US residents (also reported in USIT Table 1 line 52). The ﬂow series is
corrected by subtracting FFA table F107 line 40 (FU263163003.Q, bonds, NSA). This error
is corrected in the FFA data published after June 2004.
— levels: End of year positions from BEA.
∗ After 1976, BEA IIP Table 2 line 21 (corporate stocks, including results from the U.S.
Treasury’s 1994 and 1997 Benchmark Surveys of U.S. Ownership of Foreign Long-term
Securities).
∗ Before 1976, SCB, various lines.
— valuation adjustment: Quarterly equity portfolio dollar capital gains constructed using the U.S.
Treasury 1997 Benchmark Surveys of U.S. Ownership of Foreign Long-term Securities (Series
EQR97$). Details on returns provided in section B.3.
27According to the BOP manual, direct investment income in the CA includes distributed earnings as well as the




∗ After 1982Q1, from BEA (USIT Table 7b line A13 before 1998Q1, then USIT Table 7a line
A18).
∗ Before 1982, from FFA, Table F107 line 40 (FU263163003.Q, Bonds, NSA).
— levels: end of year positions from BEA.
∗ After 1976, positions from BEA IIP Table 2 line 20 (Bonds, including results from the
U.S. Treasury’s 1994 and 1997 Benchmark Surveys of U.S. Ownership of Foreign Long-term
Securities).
∗ Before 1976, positions available from SCB.
— valuation adjustment: Maturity Weights: 25% short term, 75% long term. No valuation adjust-
ment for short term. For long term bonds, weighted average dollar holding period excess return
(over yields) (series RN$@RW). Details on returns provided in section B.3.
• Direct Investment:
— ﬂows:
∗ After 1960Q1 from BEA (USIT Table 1 Line 51).
∗ Before 1960Q1, from FFA Table F107 line 53 (FU263192005.Q, U.S. direct investment
abroad). Note that through 1992Q4, FFA US direct investment abroad excludes net in-
ﬂows from corporate bonds issued by Netherlands Antillean ﬁnancial subsidiaries. There is
no discrepancy here since these bonds issues start after 1978.
— levels: Start positions at 0 in 1952Q1 and cumulate forward. Note that we do not benchmark
the data to the BEA IIP series (Table 2 line 18) available after 1982 at market value. The reason
is that applying the BEA valuation adjustment backwards from 1982Q4 results in negative gross
FDI asset position before 1973. Our estimated position for 1982Q4 is $267 bn. The BEA reports
$227 bn.
— valuation adjustment: Quarterly direct investment portfolio capital gains constructed using
rolling weights (series RFDR$). The weights are constructed using BEA direct investment posi-
tions by country (historical cost basis) from 1966 until 2002. The ﬁnal shares cover 75% of DI
assets in each year. The implicit annual return in the BEA positions is regressed on this capital
gain series between 1982 and 2003. The regression coeﬃcient (0.754367) is used to scale down
the capital gain series. It is smaller than one, as expected. The reason is that the BEA records
reinvested earnings as inﬂows. But reinvested earnings are also part of the capital gain series.
Without adjustment, we would be double-counting the reinvested earnings.
• Other Assets:
— ﬂows:
∗ Before 1960Q1, other asset ﬂows are constructed to match the BEA deﬁnition. We start with
other asset ﬂows deﬁned from FFA: FFA total assets (Table F107 line 35, FU264190005.Q,
Net increase in U.S. liabilities of the rest of the world) minus FFA bonds (F107 line 40,
FU263163003.Q, change in bond liabilities of the rest of the world to U.S. residents) minus
FFA equity (F107 line 47, FU263164003.Q, Net purchase of foreign corporate equities by U.S.
residents) [corrected, see the description of equity asset ﬂows] minus FFA direct investment
(F107 line 53, FU263192005.Q, U.S. direct investment abroad, excluding bonds sold by
Netherlands Antillean ﬁnancial subsidiaries). Then, we adjusts the ﬂows to map into the
BEA deﬁnitions: Other assets from FFA plus capital account (USIT Table 1 line 39) plus
change in interbank claims.
∗ After 1960Q1, deﬁned as residual from total BEA asset ﬂows: total assets (USIT Table 1
line 40, U.S. owned assets abroad) minus Equity, Debt and Direct Investment ﬂows.
37— levels: After 1976, end of year positions from BEA IIP Table 2 line 5 (U.S. oﬃcial reserve assets)
plus line 10 ( U.S. Government assets, other than oﬃcial reserve assets) plus line 22 ( U.S.
claims on unaﬃliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking concerns) and line 23 ( U.S. claims
reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere). Note that the levels and the ﬂows include Gold
Reserves.




∗ After 1973Q1, sum of BEA equity (SCB before 1982Q1, USIT Table 7b line B2 between
1982Q1 and 1998Q1 then Table 7a line B4 after) and Equity held by foreign oﬃcials (SCB
before 1982Q1, USIT Table 7b line memo 4 between 1982Q1 and 1998Q1 and Table 7a line
memo 4 after).
∗ Before 1973, FFA equity Table F10 7 line 29 (FU263064003.Q, Net purchases of U.S. cor-
porate equity by the rest of the world). The FFA data includes equity purchased by foreign
oﬃcial agencies (reported separately by the BEA).
— levels: End of year positions from BEA.
∗ After 1980, positions from IMF IIP (B8660@C111). The IMF data includes equity holdings
by foreign oﬃcial agencies.
∗ Between 1976 and 1980, comparison of the BEA IIP Table 40 (corporate stocks) show that
foreign oﬃcial holdings are 0.
∗ Before 1976, positions available from Survey of Current Business.
— valuation: quarterly equity portfolio capital gains (series EQRUS) from S&P 500 (see detailed
descriptions for returns in section B.3).
• Debt:
— ﬂows:
∗ After 1982Q1, from BEA ﬂows. Sum of private foreign holdings of US corporate and federally
sponsored agency bonds (USIT Table 7b line 10 before 1998, then Table 7a line 16 and 30)
and foreign oﬃcial holdings of U.S. government securities (USIT Table 1 line 57) and foreign
private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities (USIT Table 1 line 65) and corporate and agency
bonds held by foreign oﬃcial agencies (USIT Table 7b line memo 3 before 1998, then Table
7a memo 3).
∗ Before 1982,FFA U.S. treasury securities (Table F107.21, FU263061105.Q, treasury securi-
ties) plus U.S. agency and GSE-backed securities (Table F107.24, FU263061705) plus U.S.
corporate bonds (Table F107.27, FU263063005.Q, includes net issues by Netherland Antil-
lean ﬁnancial subsidiaries of U.S. corporations) minus estimate of net issues of corporate
bonds from Netherland Antillean ﬁnancial subsidiaries of U.S. corporations. Each FFA
series is constructed/corrected as follows:
· FFA Table F107 line 22 (FU263061113.Q, foreign oﬃcial holdings of Treasury securities),
a subcategory of F107 line 21, is incorrect before 1981Q4. The series is remapped to
BEA Table 1 line 58 (foreign oﬃcial holdings of U.S. Treasury securities).
· FFA Table F107 line 27 adjusted upwards before 1977Q3 for discontinuity in the cov-
erage of the series (see section C.2 for a methodological description on how we treat
discontinuities in coverage).
· Net issues of corporate bonds from Netherland Antillean ﬁnancial subsidiaries estimated
as the diﬀerence between minus FFA-based direct investment assets (Table F107 line
53, FU263192005.Q, U.S. direct investment abroad) and BEA-based direct investment
assets (USIT Table 1 line 51). Set to 0 before 1979Q1.
38— levels:
∗ After 1982, end of year positions from IMF IIP (B8669@C111). The IMF data includes
foreign oﬃcial agencies holdings of corporate bonds (reported separately in BEA IIP).
∗ Between 1976 and 1981, from BEA IIP (Table 2) line 27 (foreign oﬃcial holdings of U.S.
government securities) plus line 37 (foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasuries) plus line 39
(foreign private holdings of corporate and other bonds) plus line 32 (foreign oﬃcial holdings
of other assets).
∗ Between 1971 and 1976, same positions available from Survey of Current Business. No data
available before 1971.
— valuation:w ea s s u m eam a t u r i t ys t r u c t u r eo f2 5 %s h o r t term (no valuation) and 75% long term.
For the long term valuation, we use the quarterly holding excess return over yields on 10-year
U.S. government debt (series RN@C111), see section B.3.
• Direct Investment:
— ﬂows:
∗ After 1976Q4, from BEA direct investment (USIT Table 1 line 64). The FFA series (Table
F107 line 33, FU263092001.Q, foreign direct investment in the U.S.) is identical to the BEA
series after 1960.
∗ Before 1976Q4, FFA series (Table F107 line 33, FU263092001.Q, foreign direct investment
in the U.S.), adjusted upwards for the discontinuity in coverage in 1976Q4 (see section C.2
for a methodological description on how we treat discontinuities in coverage).
— levels: Start positions at 0 in 1952Q1 and cumulate forward. Note that we do not benchmark
the data to the BEA IIP series (Table 2 line 36) available after 1982 at market value. The reason
is that applying the BEA valuation adjustment backwards from 1982Q4 results in negative gross
FDI liability position before 1973. Our estimated position for 1982Q4 is $144 bn. The BEA
reports $130 bn.
— valuation: Quarterly direct investment portfolio capital gains constructed using S&P 500 capital
gains series (EQRUS). The implicit annual return in the BEA positions from 1982 to 2003 is
regressed on this capital gain series. The regression coeﬃcient (0.681023) is used to scale down
the capital gain series. It is smaller than one, as expected. The reason is that the BEA records
reinvested earnings as inﬂows. But reinvested earnings are also part of the capital gain series.
Without adjustment, we double-count reinvested earnings.
• Other liabilities:
— ﬂows:
∗ After 1976Q4, deﬁned as residual from total BEA liabilities: total liabilities (USIT Table 1
line 55) minus Debt, Equity and Direct Investment liability ﬂows.
∗ Between 1960Q1 and 1976Q3, deﬁned as residual from total BEA liabilities: total liabilities
(USIT Table 1 line 55) minus Debt, Equity and Direct Investment liability ﬂows measured
as USIT Table 1 line 64. [Note: the DI ﬂows are not adjusted upward for the discontinuity.
Hence, we are assuming that total liabilities are mismeasured before 1976Q4].
∗ Before 1960Q1, constructed from FFA to match the BEA deﬁnition (see A.2). Start with
Other Liabilities FFA ﬂows deﬁned as FFA total liabilities (Table F107 line 13, FU264090005.Q,
Net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets by the rest of the world) minus FFA bonds (F107 line 21
FU263061105, Treasury Securities, F107 line 24, FU263061705, Agency and GSE backed se-
curities, F107 line 27, FU263063005 U.S. corporate bonds, all series corrected as described
above), minus FFA equity (F107 line 29, FU263064003.Q) minus FFA direct investment
(F107 line 33, FU263092001.Q). Then adjust FFA series to map into the BEA deﬁnition:
Other Liability (FFA) minus FFA Gold and SDR (F107 line 14, FU263011005.Q, net pur-
chases of Gold and SDR from the U.S. by the rest of the world) plus change in interbank
claims (equal to zero before 1960).
39country 1952-1966 1966-1987 1987-2004 series
UK 27.43 25.44 23.61 FT-Actuaries All-Share Total Return Index
Japan 17.20 15.95 14.80 Nikko Securities Composite Total Return
France 10.72 9.94 9.23 SBF-250 Total Return Index
Netherlands 13.49 12.51 11.61 CBS Total Return-All Shares
Germany 8.19 7.60 7.05 CDAX Total Return Index
Canada 8.93 8.28 7.68 Toronto SE-300 Total Return Index
Sweden 4.89 4.54 4.21 Stockholm SBX Benchmark Gross Index.
Switzerland 0.00 7.24 6.72 Performance Index.
Italy 5.24 4.86 4.51 BCI Global Return Index
Mexico 0.00 0.00 3.79 SE Return Index
Australia 3.92 3.64 3.38 S&P/ASX 200 Accumulation Index.
Brazil 0.00 0.00 3.4 Sao Paulo IBX-50 Return Index.
Table 5: Country-Weights, Equity Assets, Total Returns.
— levels: After 1976, end of year positions from BEA IIP. Table 2 line 30 ( Other U.S. Government
liabilities) and line 31 (U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere) and line 41
(U.S. currency) and line 42 (U.S. liabilities to unaﬃliated foreigners reported by U.S. nonbanking
concerns) and line 43 (U.S. liabilities reported by U.S. banks, not included elsewhere).
— valuation:n o n e .
B.3 Returns
Most ﬁnancial and exchange rate data are obtained from the Global Financial Database (GFD) and Inter-
national Financial Statistics (IFS).
B.3.1 Assets
• Equity:
— Total return: [EQTR97$]. Equity total return for the rest of the world. The country weights
are constructed from Table 1 of The US Treasury’s (2000) report on U.S. holdings of Foreign
Long Term Securities. The country weights represent 75% of total foreign equity holdings by
U.S. investors. For each country, a series for dollar quarterly total stock return is constructed.
The local currency returns are converted into dollars using end of period nominal exchange
rates against the dollar compiled from IFS after 1957 and from GFD before. Before 1987, total
returns series for Mexico, Brazil and Switzerland (before 1966) are unavailable. The weights are
adjusted appropriately. Table 5 reports the weights by subperiod and the total return series for
each country.
— Capital gain: [EQR97$]. The equity capital gain series uses the same country-weights as Table
5. For each country, a series for dollar quarterly capital gain return is constructed. Local capital
gain returns from GFD are converted into dollars using end of period nominal exchange rates.
Country-weights are reported in Table 6.
• Debt:
— Total return: Weighted average of the total return on long term bonds and total return on short
term bonds. Maturity composition: 75% long term, 25% short term, from Table 2 in the US
Treasury’s (2003) report on U.S. holdings of Foreign Securities.
∗ Long Term: [R$@RW]. Weighted average dollar holding period return on foreign long term
bonds. The currency weights are taken from Table 11 of the US Treasury’s (2000) report on
40country 1952-1954 1954-2004 series
UK 24.44 23.61 FT-Actuaries All-Share Index
Japan 15.33 14.80 Nikkei 225 Stock Average
France 9.55 9.23 SBF-250 Index
Netherlands 12.02 11.61 CBS All-Share Price Index
Germany 7.30 7.05 CDAX Composite Price Index
Canada 7.95 7.68 S&P/TSX 300 Composite Index
Sweden 4.36 4.21 Aﬀarsvarlden General Index.
Switzerland 6.95 6.72 Stock Indices-Composites - Switzerland Price Index.
Italy 4.67 4.51 Banca Commerciale Italiana General Index
Mexico 3.93 3.79 SE Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (IPC)
Australia 3.50 3.38 ASX All-Ordinaries.
Brazil 0.00 3.40 Bolsa de Valores de Sao Paulo (Bovespa)
Table 6: Country-Weights, Equity Assets, Capital Gains.
Currency Weight (%) Source
U.S. dollar 59.67 Yields on U.S. government 10-year constant maturity bonds (IFS)
Yen 12.35 7-year Government Bond Yield (OECD)
Canadian dollar 8.64 Average yield to maturity on government bonds with life over ten years. (IFS)
German DMark 9.05 Yield on federal securities w/ residual maturities of over 9 to 10 years. (IFS)
UK pound 5.35 Gross redemption bond yield, at par with 20 year maturity (IFS)
French Franc 4.94 10-year Government Bond Yield (GFD)
Table 7: Currency-Weights, Long Term Debt Assets.
U.S. holdings of Foreign Long Term Securities for the year 1994. Given the availability of
country bond yield data, we cover about 80% of the long term debt positions. The currency
weights are reported in Table 7. Total quarterly holding period returns are calculated from
the changes in yields (assuming that the yield equals the coupon and using the formula
(10.1.19) in Campbell, Lo and MacKinlay (1997), p408) converted into U.S. dollars using
end of period nominal exchange rates compiled from IFS after 1957 and GFD before.
∗ Short Term: [RSRW$]. Weighted average dollar holding period return on foreign short term
bonds. The currency weights are taken from Table 14 of the US Treasury’s (2003) report
on U.S. holdings of Foreign Securities for 2001. With the short term returns availability, we
cover 99% of the short term debt positions. Short term local currency returns are converted
into US dollars using end of period nominal exchange rates compiled from IFS after 1957
and GFD before. The currency weights are reported in Table 8:
— Capital Gains: [RN$@RW]. Same weights are [R$@RW] but using net returns instead of total
returns, where net returns are constructed as ln(1 + RN)=ln(1 +R) −ln(1+Y )w h e r eRN is
the net return, R is the total return and Y is the yield. Local net returns converted into dollars
using end of period exchange rates.
Currency Weight (%) Source
U.S. dollar 85.09 Discount on new issues of 3 months Treasury Bill (IFS)
Dmark 4.98 Germany 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (GFD)
Yen 8.01 Lending rate for collateral and overnight loans in the Tokyo Call Money Market (IFS)
UK pound 1.92 Tender rate at which 91 days bills are alloted (IFS)
Table 8: Currency-Weights, Short Term Debt Assets.
41• Direct Investment: Returns constructed using rolling weights based on BEA’s FDI historical cost
positions, from 1966 to 2002. In each year, we cover 75% of US Direct Investment historical cost
asset positions. Some countries are excluded for some years due to the absence of stock market data
(e.g. Mexico, Brazil, Switzerland and Panama in early years). For each country, total stock return (in
dollars) computed from GFD total return indices and IFS end of period exchange rates.
— Total return:[ T R F D R $ ] .
— Capital gain:[ R F D R $ ] .
• Other Assets:
— Total return: [RSRW$]. See above
— Capital gain:n o n e .
B.3.2 Liabilities
• Equity and Direct Investment:
— Total return: [EQTRUS]. Total Return Indices-Stocks - S&P 500 Composite Total Return Index
(Base 1988) (SPXTRQ).
— Capital gain:[ E Q R U S ] :S t o c kI n d i c e s - C o m p o s ites - S&P 500 Composite (SPXQ)
• Debt:
— Total return: Weighted average of the total return on long term bonds and total return on short
term bonds. Maturity composition: 75% long term, 25% short term, from Table 2 and Table 3
in the US Treasury’s (2002) Survey of Foreign Portfolio Holdings of U.S. Securities.
∗ Long term: [R@C111]. Quarterly total return on long term bond. Calculated from the
change in yields (see formula in Campbell et al. (1997), equation 10.1.19 pp408), assuming
that the yield is equal to the coupon. Yields on U.S. government 10-year constant maturity
bonds. Before 1985.3, yield data from McCulloch and Kwon (1993), as reported by Campbell
(1999). After 1985:3, from IFS (L61@C111).
∗ Short term [R$@C111]. After 1963:4, discount on new issues of 3 months Treasury Bill (IFS
L60@C111). Before 63.4: Treasury bill rate in quarterly SBBI ﬁle in CRSP, from Campbell
(1999).
— Capital gain: [RN@C111]. Quarterly net return on long term bond deﬁned as ln(1 + RN)=
ln(1+R)−ln(1+Y )w h e r eRN is the net return, R is the total return and Y is the yield. The
yield is already included in the current account transactions.
• Other liability:
— Total return: [R$@C111]. see above.
— Capital gain:n o n e .
B.3.3 Implicit Returns
The implicit returns on each asset class are constructed as follows.
• For gross assets, we use the investment income series Table F107.7 and SCB NIPA table 9.5, line 5
(receipts of factor income), and our total valuation series for assets. We compute ra as (investment
income+valuations)/ foreign asset position at the end of the previous period.
42• For gross liabilities, we use the investment income series Table F107.3 and SCB NIPA table 9.5, line 11
(payments of factor income), and our total valuation series for liabilities. We compute rl as (investment
income+valuations)/ foreign liability position at the end of the previous period.
• A breakdown of the investment income at the level of each asset class is unfortunately not available
over the entire period. Instead, we distributed investment income across each asset in the following
way. First, we deducted from total investment income FDI-reinvested earnings. We distributed the
remaining investment income across assets in proportion to their share in total assets. Thus we obtain
estimates of investment income for equity, debt and ’other’. For FDI we add back reinvested earnings
to the FDI investment income estimated as above i.e. we add reinvested earnings to (total investment
income-reinvested earnings) multiplied by share of FDI in total assets. We then compute the implicit
return on equity assets, say, in the following way: rae =(investment income on equity+valuation
change on equity)/equity asset position at the end of the previous period. We proceed in a parallel
way for each asset class for gross assets and gross liabilities.
Appendix C
Miscellaneous Data Issues
C.1 Mapping the BEA returns for Direct Investment and the Treatment of
Reinvested Earning.
Denote PX t the stock at the end of period t for series X and FXt the ﬂow for the same period. Assume
that the returns are accrued at the beginning of the period, so that the accumulation equation from quarter
t to quarter t + 1 takes the following form:
PXt+1 = Rt+1PXt + FXt+1




We then regress the continuously compounded annual returns Rt,t+4 =l n( RtRt+1Rt+2Rt+3) on the annual
return that is used to value the BEA series, RBEA
t,t+4.
C.2 How to treat discontinuities?
The accumulation equation assumes that NDt represents capital gains. In some cases, the discontinuity
is too big to be justiﬁed by capital gains. Instead, it represents a rebasing of the underlying series (e.g.
Table F.107 line 26, U.S. corporate bond liabilities, or Table F.107 line 32, direct investment liability). The
valuation equation is
PXt+1 = PXt + FXt+1 + DXt+1
DXt reﬂects both the capital gain and the discontinuity in year t. If there is a discontinuity at time T, we
need to adjust both positions and ﬂows before T. Our approach is to attribute all the adjustment at time T
to the discontinuity. Deﬁne the adjustment factor κ =1+ DXT
PX T−1. We scale all positions, ﬂows and previous
discontinuities by κ for t<T:
P ˆ X0 = κPX0
F ˆ Xt = κFXt
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